The cyberspace war: propaganda and trolling as warfare tools by Jessikka Aro
121 1 3
 EuropEan ViEw (2016) 15:121–132
Doi 10.1007/s12290-016-0395-5




published online: 10 May 2016 
© The author(s) 2016. This article is published with open access at Springerlink.com
Abstract russian president Vladimir putin’s regime has taken control of the tradi-
tional media in russia: TV, radio and newspapers. as russian Defence Minister Sergei 
Shoigu has stated, the Kremlin sees the mass media as a ‘weapon’. now russia’s 
leadership is trying to take control of social media too, and for this massive operation a 
new information warfare tool has been mobilised—an army of fake social media putin-
fans, known as ‘trolls’. My investigation has discovered that coordinated social media 
propaganda writers are twisting and manipulating the public debate in Finland, too. 
Trolls and bots distribute vast amounts of false information in various languages, and 
target individual citizens for aggressive operations. aggressive trolls have created a 
feeling of fear among some of my interviewees, causing them to stop making russia-
related comments online. Trolling has had a serious impact on freedom of speech, even 
outside russia. Thus, it should be viewed as a national security threat that needs to be 
addressed accordingly. The question is: how should the Kremlin’s trolls and disinforma-
tion be countered?
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Introduction
aggressive pro-russia troll campaigns have manipulated the public debate and silenced 
citizens. as trolling, hacking and other oppression techniques will only get worse in the 
future, governments need to find ways to defend individuals from information attacks.
it was in September 2014 that i first began to investigate what was then the latest 
trend in russia’s information warfare: paid anonymous and aggressive social media 
commentators and their impact on Finnish public debate. information warfare has vari-
ous definitions, and in this article i use the most common one: a state-conducted, stra-
tegic series of information and psychological operations that influences the target’s 
opinions, attitudes and actions in order to support the political goals of the state’s lead-
ers. in 2000, the russian Foreign Ministry defined ‘information security’ as the ‘pro-
tection of [russia’s] national interests in the information sphere’ (russian Ministry of 
Foreign affairs 2000). in recent years the russian state’s information warfare capabili-
ties have developed rapidly to match its intentions (Giles 2016).
‘Trolls’ are part of the Kremlin’s propaganda system and technique of information war-
fare: these recruited commentators distribute the messages of russia’s political leaders 
online. The russian investigative journalist (Garmazhapova 2013) who went under-
cover in a pro-putin social media commenting office in St petersburg in 2013 dubbed 
the commentators ‘trolls’ and their office a ‘troll factory’. prior to this discovery, the 
Kremlin had already taken the traditional media under its control to serve its interests, 
with russian Defence Minister Sergei Shoigu calling the media a ‘weapon’ (Interfax 
2015). These recruited online bloggers are being used to take social media under the 
Kremlin’s control, too. The Kremlin has denied any connection to the troll factories.
as soon as i opened my investigation, i became the target of an info-war. The Finnish 
pro-Kremlin propagandists’ activities against me—disinformation campaigns and open-
source surveillance—are a text-book example of a russian information–psychological 
operation. The goal is to discredit me, make my work seem unreliable and ultimately 
stop me from disclosing facts about social media propagandists. Similar operations are 
used in russia to oppress political dissidents, journalists and others publishing facts that 
show russia’s authoritarian regime in an unfavourable light. over the past 18 months, 
my character and my journalism have been smeared in ways that no journalist in Fin-
land has ever experienced before. The systematic attacks on my work continue today.
in this article, i comment on the results of my investigations into the Kremlin trolls’ 
tactics and their impact. additionally, i provide an example of a new pro-Kremlin disin-
formation site. at the end of the article i suggest solutions that should be applied by the 
international community, governments, journalists and internet companies to counter 
aggressive online disinformation.
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The troll campaign begins with a falsified 
narrative
The Finnish public Broadcasting Company Yle’s online news site published my crowd-
sourcing article on 15 September 2014. in it i asked readers to provide me with informa-
tion and their experiences of anonymous and aggressive pro-russia propaganda trolls 
on internet sites used by Finns. i wanted answers to specific questions: which tactics 
and forums do the trolls use, and how do Finns react to troll disinformation attacks? i 
specifically asked the readers not to name individual trolls (aro 2014).
pro-Kremlin propagandists operating in the international information sphere immedi-
ately mobilised against my work. They created their own falsified narrative of me and 
my article, and spread lies on fake news sites about me ‘persecuting russians living 
in Finland and putting together an illegal database of putin’s supporters’ (antropova 
2014). i was named as a ‘famous assistant of foreign security services’ and said to 
‘cooperate with naTo’ (Russkaja Narodnaja Linya 2014). in the Kremlin’s narrative the 
uS Central intelligence agency as well as other foreign security services and naTo are 
portrayed as hostile enemies of russia.
Facebook and Twitter trolls (and actual people following their example) questioned 
my investigations and mental health, and started conducting their own ‘investigations’ 
into my social media postings and other information about me. as my contact informa-
tion was disclosed alongside the disinformation about me, my phone’s messaging and 
email inboxes were filled with messages from people angry at me for ‘persecuting rus-
sians’. i received a phone call in which someone fired a gun. Later someone texted me, 
claiming to be my dead father, and told me he was ‘observing me’ (aro 2015a).
associates of propagandists are now publishing smear songs which support the nar-
rative of me being a ‘naTo troll’ waging an info-war against russia. in one YouTube 
music video, an actress plays me: a lady wearing a blonde wig is waving naTo and uS 
flags in president putin’s face in a space resembling the Yle newsroom.
info-attacks are spiced up with ‘intel’ about my personal history. in February 2016, 
my privacy was brutally violated: over 12 years ago i was given a 300 euro fine for drug 
use. The details of this fine were dug up from court archives, and propagandists started 
to publish ‘scandal’ stories containing libellous fantasies about me selling drugs, having 
written my articles under the influence of illegal substances, being a ‘naTo information 
expert drug dealer’ and suffering from mental illness. The stories were published on 
fake sites that incite racism and on several anonymous far-right and conspiracy-theory 
sites. Twitter trolls link these filth articles to russian media.
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The trolls’ impact: people silenced, people 
confused
Despite the spread of disinformation about my work, i continued to investigate the troll 
phenomenon. i published new details and footage from the secretive St petersburg–
based troll factory where workers, pretending to be opinionated citizens, write about 
given ‘political themes’, including in English. The employees did not want to disclose 
information about their work, and the ‘news agency’ boss working at the factory claimed 
that ‘troll accusations are propaganda war’ (aro and Mäkeläinen 2015).
i studied the data my Finnish audience was sending me and investigated online sites 
and troll groups. i listed online forums that were systematically visited by pro-russia 
trolls or were spreading disinformation (aro 2015c). now, well over a year since the 
results of my crowdsourcing article were published, that list is even longer, even though 
Sputnik, a ‘news agency’ owned by the russian government, has stopped publishing in 
Finnish.
My results proved that aggressive pro-russia propaganda trolls had had an impact 
on many Finns, on their attitudes and even their actions: some had stopped discussing 
russian politics online; others had lost touch with what was true or false, for example, 
about the war in ukraine.
More concerningly some Finns had started to spread aggressive pro-Kremlin disinfor-
mation without checking their facts after being exposed to the propaganda (aro 2015b). 
in addition, one of the goals of info-war is to create chaos not only in the information 
sphere but also within society itself. in line with this aim, some people had protested 
outside Yle headquarters in Finland after being agitated by disinformation on social 
media.
Disinformation is targeted at a variety 
of audiences
as with all professional media systems, pro-russia online disinformation is designed to 
meet the needs of as many different target audiences as possible. The primary target 
group for the St petersburg troll factory seems to be ordinary citizens, but politicians 
and other public figures are targeted as well. Spreading disinformation online is cheap 
compared to television or print methods. it can also be multiplied and spread across 
borders very efficiently, as putin’s former adviser, now a uS-based researcher, andrei 
illarionov has stated (illarionov 2014).
pro-Kremlin disinformation material is first published on unreliable and non-journal-
istic media, including russian state media websites, Vkontakte, YouTube, Twitter, 
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Facebook, blogs and special websites. Comments without links are also posted straight 
to forums, and each troll has to produce hundreds of comments during a 12-hour shift.
Disinformation is designed to manipulate the receiver’s feelings. Younger and more 
visually oriented people are lured in with memes, caricatures and videos. The messages 
conveyed by trolls’ memes are simple: western political leaders are often depicted as 
‘nazis’ or ‘fascists’. images of corpses and alleged war crimes committed by ukrainian 
soldiers are distributed, as well as photos of ukrainian teenage girls wearing t-shirts 
with nazi symbols on them—in reality these have been edited in photoshop.
Social media attacks can be seemingly small, for example a 140-character tweet. My 
investigations have shown that this can be enough: some Finns told me that they had 
stopped commenting on russia-related matters online because aggressive trolls had 
called them names (e.g. ‘russophobe’, ‘nazi’ etc.) and used threatening language. The 
influence of a small message can grow when it is repeated, and some trolls have called 
tweeters the same nasty names hundreds of times.
More sophisticated psychological tactics are used to brainwash people. on Facebook, 
people’s need to belong to a community is taken advantage of. Troll group administra-
tors manipulate group members to accept their agenda by bullying or blocking all who 
oppose the leaders. Members’ comments that support the leaders’ agenda are encour-
aged by positive feedback from the administrators (‘likes’ and similar-minded com-
ments). The only option for a troll group member is to accept administrators’ views or 
face being left out. Members are tricked into believing that the offensive language used 
is a ‘normal use of free speech’.
An allegedly citizen‑sourced project that looks 
more like a suspicious information operation
Tailor-made disinformation is also provided for people who prefer in-depth ‘analy-
ses’. The needs of this target audience are met with lengthy blog articles containing 
seemingly accurate lists of sources underlining the credibility of the text. The refer-
ences, however, usually lead to other disinformation sites.
Many fake news sites, such as Sputnik, describe their content as ‘alternative’. in real-
ity this usually means ‘pro-russian’, ‘conspiracy theoretical’ and ‘anti-western’. articles 
critical of putin’s regime are not published.
in January 2016, while russia’s warplanes were bombing civilian targets such as hos-
pitals in Syria, Twitter activists founded a new pro-Kremlin domain, Southfront.org, titled 
‘South Front, analysis and intelligence’. This site promises its readers that it ‘digs out 
the truth in issues which are barely covered by the states concerned and mainstream 
media’ (South Front 2015). South Front seems to have a special target group: conflict 
news enthusiasts attracted to conspiracy theories and action films.
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The content of the South Front website is a fascinating hybrid of revealingly detailed 
military intelligence and totally bogus stories. The site has published a series of articles 
titled ‘russia Defence reports’, which visualise the actions in Syria of the insurgents 
and the armies of russia and Syrian president Bashar al-assad in a ‘text analysis’ for-
mat, as well as through Hollywood-style ‘video reports’ with exciting action film music. 
The content focuses on the success of russia’s armed forces, and showing off russia’s 
weapons. The videos have titles such as ‘russian airspace Defence Forces’, ‘(russian) 
anti-Missile Shield’, and ‘russia Develops Military infrastructure and Facilities in Lata-
kia’. Versions of the South Front website are available in other languages too. nothing 
about russia attacking civilians is published (see South Front 2016).
South Front uses Facebook to share its contents (Facebook 2016). it has over 17,500 
fans and troll profiles liking, commenting on and sharing its posts. These include arti-
cles, photos (for example, of russian military equipment in action in Syria) and other 
items, such as caricatures of uS president Barack obama promoting gay marriage. as 
on most pro-Kremlin and disinformation Facebook sites, the quality of the comments 
made by South Front readers is low. it reveals the commenters’ lack of knowledge of 
both military issues and international politics. This lack of understanding is often taken 
advantage of by the pro-Kremlin propagandists. South Front portrays itself as being 
a crowdsourced project, but it looks more like a professional info-war project run or 
backed by the russian military.
The scariest propaganda trap: subtle 
disinformation
The good news of my investigation was that some Finns had experienced or witnessed 
trolling activities but had not been influenced by them. aggressive pro-russia propa-
gandists often use such ridiculous Soviet-style argumentation that the majority of the 
audience is not interested in what they have to say at all.
Subtle and intelligent content is the most problematic to counter: not everyone recog-
nises it as the product of an aggressive foreign influencer. Thus many people let it affect 
them cognitively or psychologically. For example, the high-level parliamentary official 
peter Saramo has been found to frequent a pro-russia troll Facebook group and to 
spread false allegations. in addition, some Finnish Mps have accepted ‘bikini trolls’1 as 
friends on Facebook and have thus exposed themselves to influence through social 
media.
My investigation has established that foreign political propaganda influences parts of 
the Finnish population. This is worrying because Finland has a good school system and 
Finns are highly educated. This leads to the conclusion that even worse damage could 
1 naTo has categorised the owners of fake profiles that post trolling comments and use a photo of a beauti-
ful woman as their profile picture as ‘bikini trolls’.
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be caused in societies with a less well-educated population. Currently in Finland, there 
are education projects underway that aim to provide people with improved media lit-
eracy skills and a better understanding of disinformation and cyber-threats.
The Russian‑style impunity of trolls is not an 
option: legal measures and support are needed
Journalists covering conflicts are often the first targets for info-war campaigns and 
propagandists, as journalism undermines the effects of propaganda, and propagandists 
want to use reporters to spread disinformation among a larger audience. Both in Fin-
land and internationally there have been various cases in which pro-Kremlin influencers 
have intimidated citizens, journalists and researchers who have attempted to uncover 
russian info-war tactics or espionage.
in Finland strong legislation forbids mass media crimes, such as libel, making threats 
(death fantasies, for example, are considered threats by the courts), stalking and pub-
lishing private information with the aim of defaming an individual. Legally, social media 
is considered mass media.
The persecution of me by propagandists is being investigated by the police, and it is 
important that other disinformation targets report harassment to the police too. if politi-
cally motivated intimidation is not stopped at an early stage, it may have serious conse-
quences—not only professionally but personally, too.
in russia, independent investigative journalists, citizen activists and opposition politi-
cians often face harassment, threats and physical violence, and in the most tragic cases 
have been murdered. The intimidators of journalists and citizen activists can act with 
almost complete impunity in russia. as western countries have better justice systems 
and legislation, it is advisable to counter the illegal threats, libel and harassment of pro-
russia propagandists—as well as other hate speech agitators—with legal action. in 
Britain new legislation was passed in 2014 that means that online trolls there can face 
up to two years in jail.
if current national legislation is powerless to act on disinformation, with enough politi-
cal will it can be changed to protect the targets of hate speech. The rules of public 
debate cannot be placed in the hands of disinformation agitators, as they will use them 
to further their own political goals and not society’s best interests.
Most civilians are not psychologically prepared to operate in an info-war climate. 
in the workplaces of the targets of disinformation and hate speech, it is crucial that 
employers and workers’ unions take protective measures. Fear of being attacked is a 
natural reaction, but without proper support it could cause self-censorship. Some jour-
nalists and researchers have told me that they are too scared to publish their findings 
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because they fear the hate speech that will follow, and some citizens have already been 
silenced by the trolls.
aggressive trolling is a threat to the organisation and its functions, not just individual 
journalists or researchers. in this regard, Finland has seen a positive development: in 
February 2016 the chief editors of the Finnish media put out a joint statement saying 
that they will protect their reporters from threats.
Suing online propagandists is the ‘easiest’ legal way of tackling disinformation. a 
much trickier question is what should be done about the international blogs and fake 
news sites run by the anonymous middlemen who abuse the western freedom of 
speech and mask pro-Kremlin hate speech as ‘alternative opinions’.
From the perspective of journalism and freedom of speech, the best solution is to 
investigate suspicious sites and other info-war activities and to publish detailed articles 
about them. That is the way to raise awareness and to ensure that fewer people are in 
danger of falling into the propaganda trap. Many journalists and projects, including the 
ukrainian ‘Stop Fake’ project and the @EuvsDisinfo Twitter account, do this by regu-
larly exposing propaganda as such.
if propaganda sites break the law, the police need to find the people running the sites. 
Latvia recently blocked the Latvian Sputnik site because it spreads russian propa-
ganda. Foreseeably, russia opposed the move as ‘censorship’, which is an absurd and 
‘trolling’ statement coming from russia.
Finland has also taken action to counter disinformation: the prime Minister’s office 
has set up a group that exchanges knowledge about disinformation targeted at Finland 
and has started to train government officials on the subject of information war.
Social media giants should take a strict 
approach to hate speech
The key enablers and thus the potential solvers of the troll problem are the interna-
tional social media companies Facebook and Twitter. Both provide harassers and prop-
agandists with a platform on which to publish death fantasies, libel and lies, but leave 
crimes for the victims and local police to tackle. Making user reports about hate speech 
trolls does not currently help much, as Facebook replies to many such reports with the 
automatic reply ‘user/content is not breaking the community standards’. at the same 
time, we have seen real people’s profiles temporarily shut down after false waves of 
reports. For Facebook, Finnish language trolling seems to be a new business opportu-
nity: Facebook has even sold ads to an anonymous disinformation site. However, there 
are positive developments too: in spring 2016 Facebook did close down the page of one 
pro-russia disinformation agency, Doni news (Donbass international news agency), 
which is run by the Donetsk-based information warrior Janus putkonen.
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Twitter is almost as passive as Facebook: it lets pro-Kremlin bots and fake profiles 
operate quite freely—even though fake identities and the use of Twitter for illegal activi-
ties are forbidden.
Both Facebook and Twitter need to start ‘cleaning up’ the fake profiles that are coor-
dinating nasty operations against citizens. Both companies are uS-based and probably 
find it difficult to check the authenticity of suspected trolls, but this effort has to be made 
for the sake of freedom of speech and information peace. at the moment, an individual 
user is quite helpless against an orchestrated hate campaign. The same applies to You-
Tube, which provides a platform for propaganda videos and hate speech.
The normal news media should also take a stricter approach. Media news comment 
sections are filled with trolls questioning the news reports. Some international media 
have even closed the comment sections because of trolls. in this situation a very simple 
solution is to ensure that comment sections are properly moderated.
another internet giant, Google, also needs to address the issue of trolling. as things 
currently stand, Google searches for ‘russia’ or ‘ukraine’ bring up many results for dis-
information websites. This is another goal accomplished for the propagandists: search 
engines are becoming filled with nonsense and being used to build a digital footprint, for 
example, for the imaginary state of the people’s republic of Donetsk. if Google does 
not organise and check the relevance of the search results it offers, who will?
Information defence is needed—and soon
in 2015, Finnish cybersecurity expert Jarno Limnéll stated that the phenomenon of pro-
russia information influencing will continue to grow (aro 2015b). From the results of my 
investigations and experiences, i agree. russia is increasing its control of the internet 
and pouring money into info-war operations—as long as its failing economy remains 
manageable, the Kremlin will continue to ‘protect its interests’ in the infosphere.
Brutal privacy breaches and personal ‘black pr’ campaigns combining elements of 
social media stalking are not restricted to journalists or researchers, but also target pri-
vate citizens. an indicative example of this is the experience of a private Finnish Twitter 
activist, who commented on and criticised russia’s actions in ukraine (Twitter activist, 
who wants to stay anonymous, pers. comm.). Details of this activist’s profession and 
workplace, as well as clear hints about his employer, were later published in an anony-
mous English-language Sputnik online ‘report’.
Currently, many citizens face and counter organised trolling and disinformation cam-
paigns without assistance from security officials. i am not aware of any cases in which 
the Finnish social media police have actively protected pro-russia abuse targets on troll 
sites.
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among the countermeasures needed is a proper information defence mechanism that 
protects people and societies from troll attacks and disinformation. Finnish researcher 
and author Saara Jantunen, who has a ph.D. in military science, is currently research-
ing modern information defence methods. Jantunen became a target for pro-russia 
propagandists in September 2014, after she publicly stated that the St petersburg troll 
factory might be conducting an internet war and described the factory operations. Last 
year Jantunen published a book on modern information warfare titled Infosota (info-
war), and she has stated that the Finnish public debate concerning russia is the result 
of decades of targeted psychological operations (Jantunen 2016). if an information 
defence mechanism is not developed, the propagandists will gain new victories with 
their operations: they will oppress and confuse even more people, and gain the ability to 
mobilise people to commit serious actions outside the information sphere.
it is important to bear in mind that information operations against citizens might only 
be one phase in this form of warfare—cyber-espionage and cyber-attacks against citi-
zens may follow. Today, russian cyber-espionage is conducted by hacker groups that 
are seemingly unconnected to the Kremlin and target high-level government agencies. 
as the St petersburg troll factory is suspected of having connections with the rus-
sian security services, will we see citizens becoming the targets of cyber-espionage or 
hacking too? if the pro-russia activists and their associates are willing to face criminal 
charges for their actions in Finland, what else are they capable of? if western govern-
ments do not already have their best cyber-experts on the case then they should ensure 
that they soon do.
president of Finland Sauli niinistö has made the interesting point that countering dis-
information is the duty of every citizen in the furtherance of national defence (Hallamaa 
2015). in contrast, i want to emphasise—as a journalist and the target of an info-war 
campaign—that western countries should defend their citizens when they are in need 
of defence. information defence cannot be outsourced to the public—if it is, there is 
a high risk that there will be new victims, as every free citizen silenced, confused or 
manipulated by a Kremlin troll can be seen as a casualty of info-war. The St peters-
burg troll factory (and possibly similar factories elsewhere), alongside the russian state 
media, is up and running, creating an ‘alternative’ pro-Kremlin online reality and produc-
ing fake comments and news 24/7—at full speed.
Open Access This article is distributed under the terms of the Creative Commons attribution 
License which permits any use, distribution, and reproduction in any medium, provided the original 
author(s) and the source are credited.
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